Actually, it is probably true that virtually all so- called "democracies" are oligocracies. Even if every permanent resident had the nominal right to be represented in a country's legislature, in fact many of them for a variety of reasons do not or cannot vote -- they are, therefore, subjects rather than citizens. Traditionally, we have used "subjects" only for persons subject to monarchic control: they have many duties but few rights. In republics, by contrast, everyone is at least nominally a "citizen". However, in oligocracies, citizens and subjects coexist. Those who are represented in legislative assemblies are citizens and those who cannot vote are subjects.
Most theorists of democracy assume, I think, that our goal should be to integrate everyone into a polity so that all can be represented -- so that resident aliens (as subjects) can become naturalized citizens, and oligocracies can become democracies. However, increasingly we find, I think, that within the successor states of the modern empires, there are many subjects, mainly ethnonationals, who do not want to become citizens even if they are given the opportunity -- ethnic cleavages prevail. The ethnonational quest for sovereignty is not only difficult but it can be dangerous: the struggle for independence often leads to violence and genocide.
In this context can we think of a formula like that which prevails in the Isle of Man -- where subjects of the British Crown are, simultaneously, citizens of an autonomous nation? It is hard to discuss this possibility because we lack a term for it. Federalism is incorrect because it presupposes not only the autonomy of each state but also the equal participation of their citizens in the election of representatives to an elected assembly.
In the best known prototype, the United States, every sub-state has, in principle, substantially the same ethno- linguistic composition -- Puerto Rico as a separate linguistic "dominion" remains outside the Union as a "commonwealth," as does Guam, the Marianas, and many Indian "reservations." We need a concept that links the United States as a federation of 50 states with a congeries of non- states that do, in fact, exercise sovereignty but they are culturally (ethnically) different from the dominant community. On the British analogy, they are like "dominions" exercising effective self-government under the authority of the Crown, but not of Parliament. In the UN analogy, they resemble "trusteeships," having a separate sovereignty while under the authority of a "trustee." Typically, one member of such a union may be dominant, perhaps as the "first among equals." Could we call the core domain its heartland and its satellite territories, its marches? Each march would have its citizens who, though not represented in the core assembly, would exercise self-government in their own marches.
Addominiums. Provisionally, let me call any such union an addominium that recognizes self-government for its minorities, brings them under a collective political umbrella, but does not ask them to be governed by an assembly in which they are not represented. #16 Can we at least speculate about the possibility of an independent state, a member of the UN, that might be composed of several fully autonomous entities or dominions, each with its own representative assembly and complete administrative autonomy. An addominium assembly or general court might be established to resolve disputes between its component dominions, each of which, within its own domain, would be self-governing. For certain purposes -- international relations, for example -- an addominium might resemble the European Union. Its greatest benefit would be to enable otherwise marginalized ethnic communities to achieve self-government as sovereign entities.
To some extent, the United States is in fact an addominium. Currently Guam, the Marianas and Puerto Rico have "commonwealth" status which permits self-government and rights of citizenship but not full equality of status nor representation in the Congress. Moreover, within the territorial heartland of the U.S., a substantial number of Indian nations ("tribes") have various degrees of self- government and autonomy.
Nevertheless, the American Congress which represents only U.S. citizens, also exercises authority over subject populations unrepresented in this assembly. I see no easy way to overcome this anomaly in any presidentialist regimes. It lacks any center of authority outside that of its elected officials -- discounting the Supreme Court whose members, of course, are appointed by these elected politicians. The dilemma may be illustrated by a question which arose when the Northern Mariana Islands became a self-governing Commonwealth in 1977, and its residents became U.S. citizens. The question was whether the Commonwealth's representative in Washington should have a "quasi- diplomatic" status or be granted a Congressional presence -- without voting rights -- such as that now enjoyed by the commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As yet, this issue appears to be unresolved.
By contrast, in parliamentary monarchies, where the crown retains substantial prestige and may serve effectively as a head of state, the various dominions in an addominium could accept the authority of the crown without becoming subjects of a heartland parliament in which they were not represented. At least in principle a framework exists for linking highly autonomous dominions in a union that does not grant jurisdiction over its subjects to an assembly elected by its citizens. Thus peoples living in an addominium could be citizens within their own dominions but not elsewhere. However, all dominions in an addominium could share certain rights and duties as members of a single union (addominium), accepting the suzerainty of a single crown, but not the domination of its elected assembly.
Of course, parliamentary republics lack such a residual authority but a functional equivalent for the Crown might be found in India's Council of States composed of indirectly elected representatives from the states. With analogies to the House of Lords in the UK, or the U.S. Senate, as originally conceived, such a body might be able to unify a union of self-governing dominions, but I do not see any good precedents for an effective all-union authority in an addominium, regardless of whether it be presidential or parliamentary in design. Yet it is not difficulty to imagine an omni-council or addominium assembly on which representatives of all the dominions in a union could meet to discuss their common problems and resolve their differences -- the basic principle of representation would be based on group rather than individual rights -- a principle reflected in the membership of the UN General Assembly.
Finally, could an elected president in a parliamentary state perhaps be more capable of unifying an addominium than could the president of a presidentialist republic? My guess is that the heavy responsibilities carried by any president as a head of government in the heartland of an addominium make it impossible for the same person to serve effectively as a unifying head of state for all of the component dominions in its marchlands.#17 As a case in point, consider the Russian Federation today where, although an uneasy truce has been arranged, no stable formula seems to be available to permit self-government in a Chechnya that remains part of Russia. I do not consider this position to be a strong one, but my guess is that, ultimately, parliamentary regimes can, more easily than presidentialist polities, develop unifying principles to hold together a state in which ethnonational minorities are permitted to exercise self-government or administrative autonomy.
CONCLUSION
When governance in America and other presidential regimes is compared with governance in most parliamentary systems, it becomes evident, I think, that presidentialism faces greater obstacles than parliamentarism in creating a sense of legitimacy for the state and in managing the problems generated by industrialism and ethnic controversies. The historical successes of the United States and veneration for its Charter as felt by most Americans means that its constitutional design is likely to continue indefinitely without fundamental changes, and without general recognition of the oligarchic requisites for its success. This exceptional model should not deceive observers in other countries where, especially in the successor states of the modern empires, the presidentialist formula is surely a recipe for disaster.
The truth of this conclusion needs more testing by empirical analysis and critical assessment of the theoretical explanations offered here. Such data can be found in the historical record (see note #7 and Riggs 1993). One might suppose that American advisers in other countries would warn them against the dangers involved in copying the American model. Unfortunately, because they do not systematically compare the American experience with that of other presidentialist regimes, they are unaware of the inherent difficulties involved in the separation-of-powers design. They prefer to think that, because proto-modern United States constitution has, indeed, survived with widespread applause for two centuries, it must be a model that can be emulated with advantage by other countries. When they compare different parliamentary regimes with each other, it becomes easy enough to point to cases where, for various reasons, parliamentarism has worked quite badly. When conclusions from comparative analysis are made by reference to the worst cases of parliamentarism and the most (if not only) successful case of presidentialism, how credible are these results?
My own conclusion is that, with reference to the major aspects of modernity -- industrialism, nationalism and democracy --parliamentary regimes have a better chance than presidentialist ones of coping with the major para-modern challenges.
1. Industrialism: the bureaucracies available to presidentialist regimes are unable to cope in an integrated way with the wide range of highly technical and contentious issues generated by the world industrial system -- if they were to establish a mandarin bureaucracy that could, more adequately, cope with these problems, they would quickly fall under the domination of these public officials.
2. Nationalism: the centripetalizing electoral and party systems needed to sustain a presidentialist oligocracy are so unresponsive to the needs of diverse ethnic minorities that they cannot effectively respond to the demands generated by ethnic diversity, and they find it even more difficult to handle the demands for sovereignty or self-determination made by ethnonationalist leaders.
3. Democracy: presidential regimes experience greater difficulty than parliamentary systems in solving the inherent problems of democracy, notably the generation of authentic representativeness among citizens with conflicting interests, and their ability to maintain legitimacy as sovereign states. Presidentialism is most likely to survive by maintaining oligarchic domination and a weakened bureaucracy, both of which undermine the sense of state legitimacy needed to inspire citizens to respect a country's laws and obey its public officials -- a detailed discussion of this dimension of the subject can be found in Riggs (1997a). By contrast, parliamentary regimes find it easier to meet the needs for representativeness and legitimacy confronted in all democracies.
The inherent difficulties experienced by presidentialist regimes in solving these modern problems does not mean that parliamentarism offers a "magic bullet," that it can assuredly solve these problems. For various historical, economic, demographic, geographic and other reasons, many of the new states of the world will continue to live in poverty and despair, under weak authoritarianism and anarchy, experiencing violence and self-destructive behavior, genocide, "ethnic cleansing," civil wars and terrorism. However, if any state can establish a constitutional democracy, I believe its prospects for success will be significantly higher if its constitution supports parliamentary rather than presidential rules for self- government. Whether or not these hypotheses are true remains to be shown, but the arguments that support them are seem strong enough to deserve serious attention.
See linked pages: [] COPING, I || COPING, II || COPING, III || COPING, IV || ENDNOTES || REFERENCES []
Return to top of this page or click here for Home Page links:
| Personal Autobio | PubAd GRD | Globalization Concepts | Ethnicity ETHNIC-L | COCTA Onoma | COVICO Choices | Impeach SITES |
Search Engines |
Click here for links on the Social Science Web Sites page:
Updated: 11 June 2000
