IN RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION,

In the next three sections of his paper I shall discuss each of these three challenges, arguing that, in general, parliamentary democracies can do better than those anchored in the separation of powers.

II: THE CHALLENGE OF LEGITIMACY

The basic problem of legitimacy involves the modern transition from monarchic to popular sovereignty. The former myth was rooted in supernatural beliefs about the magical ability of rulers to bring peace and prosperity to their subjects -- it was widely held in all traditional civilizations, and persists today in small pockets around the world. Subjects respected monarchic authority because they expected to benefit from its exercise -- not because any human being could confer such benefits, but because they believe the ruler, though appropriate conduct, including royal rituals, was able to achieve these results.

By contrast, as secularism and the belief in popular sovereignty spread, acceptance of monarchic sovereignty declined. If sovereignty really belonged to the people, they had a right to govern themselves. On a small scale this could be done through direct assemblies of the people themselves -- the Athenian case provides the classic model. However, since direct democracy is clearly not feasible when population size makes face-to-face relations among all citizens impossible, indirect democracy through elected representatives gained widespread acceptance as an equivalent form of self-government. Because of the diversity of views and interests found in every population, it also seemed reasonable to accept the possibility that a representative assembly could make decisions that would legitimately reflect the interests of diverse constituencies. This fundamental belief is reflected in the design of parliamentary regimes where an elected assembly (a Parliament) has the authority to monitor the executive power and replace the government on a vote of no confidence. The transition from monarchic to popularly sovereignty is, therefore, well represented in parliamentary systems and, in the minds of the public, legitimizes the exercise of governmental authority.

By contrast, the separation-of-powers design found in presidentialist democracies resulted from a transitional phase of conflict in the evolution from divine monarchy to representative democracy. It originated, mainly in the Americas, at a time when European kings and elected assemblies were struggling for power. The result was an unstable compromise in which the right to rule was vested concurrently in popularly elected assemblies and in elected an chief executive. To avoid conflicts between these branches that could easily topple regimes organized on this principle, a complex set of checks and balances was invented that enabled each branch to block the other until, hopefully, they could reach compromise agreements. As a result, the ability of these regimes to govern was seriously handicapped. Perhaps most importantly, the lack of a coherent focus of representation for the principle of popular sovereignty seriously limits the legitimacy of such regimes.

The Office of the President

A crucial contradiction arises in the design of the office of a President -- I will capitalize this word to distinguish the Presidents in presidentialist regimes from presidents in parliamentary systems and dictatorships. Note, also, that in references to the regime type, presidential is not capitalized, whereas references to the office of President are capitalized. As a carry-over from the monarchic principle, the Congress was recognized as head of state, an office thought to legitimize the government and inspire popular respect and obedience. At the same time, the Congress also received a mandate to serve as head of government, to manage the bureaucracy and implement public policies. In both functions the Congress is seriously handicapped.

First, and most importantly, elected Congresss lack any supernatural authority. As a representative of the people who elected him, his or her mandate is completely this-worldly. No doubt, popular and gracious Congresss can rule with dignity and intelligence -- at Presidents' Day ceremonies in the U.S. (February 22 was Washington's birthday) all American Congresss are commemorated, but commentators note wryly that many of them were not worthy of much respect! The point is that, unlike sacred monarchs, no one ever pretended that Congresss, as Congresss, had any charismatic or sacred powers that could benefit their subjects. In fact, no matter how great a Congress may be as a human being, the incumbent cannot confer real legitimacy on a government -- it cannot replace a crowned king as a source of sovereignty.

Moreover, and this may be a more practical and transparent consideration, all Congresss, as heads of government, need to involve themselves in controversial policy issues that create enemies as well as supporters among their citizens. The essentially controversial position of head of government undermines the Congress's capacity to exercise a unifying political role as head of state. Since that role is inherently impossible because it lacks a believable source of sovereignty, inter-branch conflicts further erode the possibility that any Congress in a presidentialist regime can effectively serve as a source of sovereign ylegitimacy.

More importantly, and this is a somewhat elusive point, the role of head of government is inherently a precarious one as bridge or linchpin between the legislative and executive branches. The executive branch is not just its head but a vast body of hierarchically subordinated but typically rather autonomous bureaucratic agencies, including the armed forces. No head of government is automatically able to command effectively all those agencies and officials under his/her nominal authority. In fact, the separation of powers principle undermines a Congress's ability to head the government because it empowers the Congress, and more especially its committees, to make effective budgetary authorizations that control the destiny of government agencies -- hereafter, I capitalize Congress when using it generically to refer to the elected assembly in a presidentialist regime. In fact, therefore, Congresss do not just confront Congress as a whole, they must deal with a host of Congressional committees that have the power to determine the fate of bureaucratic offices, including the military. When Congresss seek to strengthen their capacity to serve effectively as head of government, they always confront the power of Members of Congress who can undermine their efforts and create conflicts between and with all the agencies of government nominally under the Congress's authority. The separation of power principle, therefore, not only fails to provide an effective head of state as legitimizer of the state but also undermines the capacity of Congresss as heads of government to manage public programs and policies in an efficient way. In fact, the separation-of-powers principle also fragments the power of any head of government. To govern effectively, a Congress needs to look for ways to dominate the Congress, a process that undermines the roots of democracy.

When, as often enough happens, public authority in these regimes is seriously challenged, a crisis can occur leading to collapse. Rarely, the Congress has enough bureaucratic support, especially among the armed forces, to seize control, disband the Congress, and rule despotically. However, more frequently, a collapse occurs, leading to a coup d'etat in which a group of military officers seizes control and, with the support of a substantial number of officials (including both civil and military personnel) sets up a regime based on force rather than legitimate authority. By suspending the Congress and replacing the Congress, those who seize power by violence defy the constitutional rules on which presidentialist regimes are predicated. Military rulers, of course, have even less legitimacy than any regime based on popular elections. Although charismatic leaders sometimes emerge during or shortly after a military coup, the frequence with which presidentialist regimes have collapsed provides evidence of their basic lack of legitimacy even while, presumably, operating under the rules of constitutional democracy.

One consequence of regime collapse is suspension of the constitution. This means that in virtually all presidentialist regimes -- except the United States -- there have been frequent charter changes. Military rulers rarely last for very long and the collapse of their precarious grip on power is normally followed by an effort to restore democracy on the basis of a new constitution. However, new constitutions lack much legitimacy -- they gain prestige and authority with age. The oldest such constitution is that of the U.S. which, accordingly, has acquired the greatest prestige and, in the absence of an effective living institution that can legitimize government, the document (as amended) becomes a surrogate for legitimacy. For detailed information on the Constitution and many useful commentaries -- including background documents from Polybius to Montesquieu that celebrate the virtues of separating powers -- see: USCon

Since the main bulwark of any presidentialist constitution is a Supreme Court charged with responsibility for invalidating decisions by the other two branches that violate the constitution, we have the paradox that the most important institutional base for protecting a presidentialist constitution is a non-elective court. As a result, although the Court does help to preserve the Constitution, it is no substitute for it as a focus of legitimizing authority.

However, the Court can also be a constitutional innovator that sometimes helps up-date a text as it becomes increasingly anachronistic -- the vast changes wrought by modernity and globalization increasingly call for constitutional reforms that cannot be implemented without doing violence to the formally amended text. To illustrate what I have in mind, consider the implications of the Rowe vs. Wade decision which gave constitutional protection to abortion, under the guise of protecting a woman's right to privacy. Such a right was imputed to the Constitution but some constitutional lawyers question the validity of this claim. For a discussion of the Court's expansion of "due process" protection to include "substantive rights," take a look at: SDP . Perhaps one reason the American constitutional system has been able to survive may be attributed to the ability of its Supreme Court to revise the Constitution, substantively, while supposedly just protecting its integrity.

As for the Congress, instead of serving as a legitimizing institution, it has more often become a focus of contention as a mirror of the nation's discontents and grievances. Moreover, it's apparent weakness is dramatized by the ease with which Congressial vetoes can nullify Congressional decisions. Instead, therefore, of consolidating the regime's legitimacy as its main representative organ, the Congress has often become a butt of ridicule and anti-government protest. This point is particularly important when we make comparisons with the strikingly different situation in countries having a parliamentary system of government.

The Role of Parliament

Under parliamentary rules, an elected assembly not only exercises the right to recognize and discharge the chief executive (usually a committee called the cabinet, headed by a prime minister who is only the first among equals), but it can also mirror in its discourse the salient interests and ideas of the public, its constituents, without allowing this discourse to undermine the ability of the government to govern. Unlike a Congress, the most important function of a Parliament is not to make laws -- rather, it is to monitor the Government and criticize its performance, but not to block its ability to make decisions and to act. The idea that any representative body can truly reflect the sovereignty is no doubt a myth, but it is a far more believable myth that the notion that a Congress can act for everyone in a presidentialist system. Moreover, the ability of a Parliament to discharge the Government provides demonstrable evidence of its sovereign authority, something the right of impeachment fails to give any Congress in a presidentialist regime.

Members of Parliament also enjoy a freedom of speech and debate that embelishes their authority. and, thereby, enhances the legitimacy of government. Under separation of powers principles, members of any Congress are responsible not only for the ratification or rejection of policies recommended by the Government, but they also initiate laws and policies, subject always to a Congressial veto. This means that Congress is seen as both a barrier to effective governance and also as ineffectual. Moreover, because all laws cannot be debated in plenary sessions, every Congress is compelled to delegate substantial power to its committees and, for the most part, subject to some safeguards, to accept their recommendations. When they do engage in public debate, or hold public hearings, they are often compelled to consider complicated details that are incomprehensibly boring to the general public even though of critical importance to those directly concerned. The result is that Congressional debates do not normally provide good theater that attracts favorable public attention.

By contrast, the practice of challenging government departments in response to citizen protests gives members of Parliament a great opportunity to use their debates both to entertain and inform the general public. They may not produce policy decisions, but they persuade their audience that someone cares about their interests and is trying to protect them. Since members of the opposition as well as majority members of Parliament can participate in such debates, it is possible for all points of view to be heard. In practice, therefore, as well as in theory, a Parliament in any parliamentary system can serve far more effectively than a Congress as the locus of sovereign legitimacy for a regime. Parliaments act as surrogates for popular sovereignty because they can hold a government accountable, and even revise constitutional rules, not because the can make ordinary laws. The transition from monarchic to popular sovereignty, therefore, is far more effectively made through a Parliament than through an elected President. In fact, having a President as head of state can be viewed as a purely symbolic vestige of an out-dated institution.

At a time when all states are challenged by the manifold consequences of globalization, having a constitutional system that enhances the legitimacy of the state increases its capacity to resist threatening changes and take advantage of promising opportunities. The lack of legitimacy in any regime leads to popular resistance whenever government decisions run counter to the perceived interest of many citizens. It does not necessarily lead to bad decisions -- it only means that the regime is seriously handicapped in its efforts to make and implement controversial public policies. The current Congressial primaries in the U.S. illustrate a result: every candidate wants to increase the benefits that all citizens can share while reducing the burden on tax payers. They prefer to avoid taking stands on controversial issues which could be effectively resolved only if there were widespread acceptance of the government's right to make and implement such decisions. They want to be seen as sugar daddies offering a cornucopia of goodies rather than as tough leaders able to deal with hard choices in a global arena of forbidding challenges.

III: THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Among these challenges, perhaps the most salient arises from the challenges every contemporary state now confronts to implement the complex and costly policies needed to cope with the threats and opportunities generated by globalization. Since most problems are highly interlinked, this means that the policies themselves need to be designed interactively. To illustrate the point, consider again the issues raised by protesters at the recent WTO conference in Seattle. The obvious issues are those raised by free trade. If corporations can use industrial parks in poor and corrupt countries to permit them to exploit cheap labor, despoil the environment and avoid paying taxes, then workers in countries which enforce laws that protect labor and the environment, and also compel corporations to pay taxes, will be disadvantaged. However, protectionist measures that ban the importation of cheaper products which meet all quality standards also penalize consumers who are compelled to pay more as a hidden subsidy. Finding acceptable solutions to such dilemmas poses a serious challenge for officials charged with responsibility for negotiating and implementing whatever decisions might be made in the WTO.

However, the protesters also raises issues that go well beyond the economics of supply and demand. If cheaper products can be made only under conditions that exploit women, children, and underpaid workers, then what policies or penalties would be appropriate to overcome such abuses? When the corporations and host countries protest that, in fact, workers in these factories are better paid than their counterparts in the same country, or even that having a job is better than being unemployed, how should one respond? In a global context, when one state takes steps to protect the welfare of its citizens, how should we react to protests by other states whose citizens may suffer as a result? Moreover, when making cheap products is possible only by environmental abuses, such as clear cutting forests in a way that leads to erosion, flooding, the destruction of habitat for indigenous peoples and endangered species, how should we respond? When tax avoidance is made possible by corrupting officials, and the state's involved are unable or unwilling to take steps to correct these abuses or even to achieve democratization, what should we do? All such questions raise issues of profound importance and complexity. The officials charged by any government to negotiate on its behalf need to have a lot of experience and knowledge in order to arrive at appropriate and acceptable decisions.

Globalization confronts officials in all countries with terribly complex and linked questions that require great experience and competence if good decisions are to be made. Here I am using efficiency to refer to all the qualities needed by public administrators in order to make and implement the complex decisions that globalization increasingly requires. The immediately relevant question is whether or not constitutional design has any implications for the employment of officials qualified to deal with these issues. In general, I believe all democracies are more likely than non-democracies to have officials able to cope with such questions, for reasons indicated in section one, above. I also believe that, among democracies, those with parliamentary constitutional systems are likely to be better qualified than are personnel employed by presidentialist regimes for reasons to be discussed next.

The Importance of Superbureaucrats

The main reason for this difference arises from the capacity of fused (parliamentary) regimes to employ career generalists by contrast with the inability of presidentialist regimes to do this. Under the conditions of separation of powers, high level "superbureaucrats" (to use Colin Campbell's term [1979]) would surely be able to dominate the regime by non-violent penetration of the highest offices of governance. By superbureaucrats (or mandarins) I refer to career generalists who, after years of work for a government, are promoted to staff positions in the offices of top officials and legislators. Because of the inherently precarious positions held by both the executive head and legislators in separation-of-powers regimes, it would not be difficult, I think, for superbureaucrats assigned to help them to actually dominate their thinking and become, de facto, the real rulers. By contrast, in parliamentary governments, decision-making powers are coordinated in a cabinet whose members are usually elected members of Parliament and, more importantly, whose decision-making processes are governed by the need to retain a majority in Parliament and hence, to cooperate in making policy decisions. Although they also depend heavily on the advice offered by mandarin officials, they know that, ultimately, their decisions also have to be acceptable to the elected members of Parliament. In short, the fusion of powers under parliamentary government enables a regime to employ and keep ultimate control over a staff of permanent generalist officials. These officials, because of their extensive experience and high qualifications are able to provide the advice needed by cabinets to coordinate and lead governments facing very complex global problems.

The Need for Patronage

By contrast, in order for a presidentialist regime to maintain control over its bureaucracy, it needs to rely heavily on patronage. Only when they have the authority to choose persons whose loyalty can be counted on can Congresss and members of a Congress feel confident of their own capacity to stay in charge. Even though they may delegate heavy workloads and much responsibility to their employees, they also have the right to discharge them and this authority enables them to stay on top of the governmental processes.

However, reliance on patronage at the highest levels of governance has two main costs. Although such appointees may be well qualified on the basis of their private sector experience, they are often not fully informed about the problems facing their agencies. Moreover, patronage leads to malintegration because, typically, each appointee, regardless of personal experience and competence, lacks the incentives needed to make the compromises required to achieve integration between rival government departments and programs. This deficiency is most conspicuous in the design of presidential cabinets whose members are executive appointees with few reasons for wanting to accommodate the competing needs of other agencies. By contrast, Cabinets in parliamentary systems need to compromise in order to be able to present a coherent package of legislation to Parliament -- I shall capitalize CABINET to refer to the executive body in a parliamentary regime, whereas the same word, uncapitalized, refers to a committee of department heads as found in other regime types, including presidentialist democracies. What applies at the cabinet level in presidential systems applies also at lower levels where a host of committees and sub-committees may be established to facilitate coordination, though with disappointing results.

No doubt it is possible for a chief executive and cabinet members to appoint individuals who are not only loyal but also highly qualified. However, in many countries it seems clear that loyalty takes precedence over competence and individuals without the necessary experience and knowledge are named to positions of great responsibility in the government. Moreover, in many presidentialist regimes RETAINERISM * prevails. By this I mean, persons who have been appointed to public office on the basis of patronage are able to retain a post in government even when the administration changes following new elections. Such retainers are simply "bumped" to a different or subordinate position so that new appointees can be put in charge. When they are not well qualified for their new positions, feel resentful because of the way they are treated, and encounter hostility from their new associates, morale is harmed and administrative incompetence often results.

Some of these difficulties have been solved, exceptionally, in the U.S. by institutionalizing an "in-and-out" routine whereby patronage appointees leave office when new Congresss are elected -- in the American case they often leave before that deadline! The point is that, for historical reasons, it has been possible in the U.S. to overcome some of the most debilitating consequences of presidentialism, but retainers in office are so powerful in most presidentialist regimes that they are able to protect their jobs and prevent significant administrative reforms. Such reforms involve appointing career officers to specialized posts in government on the basis of competitive examinations. Any significant transformation of public administration designed to replace retainers with career specialists is almost impossible to achieve. Moreover, when careerists are specialists, they tend to remain in a single agency or department for long periods of time, acquiring interests and attitudes that hamper effective coordination between different agencies. For details, see: Riggs, 1997

Generalists in public administration (mandarins) are much more likely to be able to empathize and solve problems involving compromise and the harmonizing of competing bureaucratic interests. In short, the kind of public servants parliamentary regimes are able to employ are more likely, in my opinion, to be able to deal effectively with the problems and opportunities presented by globalization. They are not only qualified by their experience to achieve integrative compromises in domestic administration, but this experience better qualifies them to sit down with opposite numbers from other countries in order to sort out problems, make acceptable compromises, and arrive at joint decisions that can minimize the harm done by globalization and optimize the advantages it offers. No doubt all parliamentary regimes are not ideally equipped with highly qualified administrative machinery, but I believe that, in most cases, their bureaucracies will be better able to deal with the problems posed by globalization than will officials in presidentialist regimes.

IV: THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM

Although many problems can be explained by the growing interdependence of the world system (i.e., globalization) let me focus on just one of these problems that seems to be especially important. We often think of ethnic conflict and nationalism in historical terms as a residue of past conflicts between communities whose members have long lived in tension with each other. Although it is true that all civilizations have, by definition, included cities and hinterlands in which culturally different peoples coexisted, the fact is that their ethnic differences were not, normally, a focus of conflict, although no doubt there were tensions between them. I use ETHNIC COMPLEXITY * to characterize any situation in which communities that are culturally different live in contact with each other. Traditionally, in ethnically complex societies, members of different communities often united to support ruling elites whose major conflicts were with each other. Historical complexity has been exploited in contemporary ethnic conflicts, but it does not provide an explanation for the eruption of modern ethnic conflicts. In order to understand how democracies can cope with this problem, we need a better understanding of its modern causes.

Modernity, exploding because of globalization, has brought a radical transformation in inter-ethnic relations. Most importantly, the equalitarian norms and the demands for social mobility associated with democratization and industrialization are replacing traditional social systems rooted in the acceptance of inequalitarianism and social immobility. Although there are precedents for such a transformation in several historical civilizations, it was only in the West that it became the dominant rule of life. As a result of the rise and collapse of industrial empires and the explosion of modern communications and transportation technologies, the whole world is now exposed to the utterly wrenching experience of trying to replace traditional caste-like social structures with modern class-based practices. Such a transformation cannot take place overnight. Instead, it is a wrenching process, producing many endangered groups who seek to protect their threatened privileges and activists who strive to obtain promised advantages. Globalization has accelerated this transformative process and greatly heightened the tensions and resulting conflicts they cause.

The Modern State as Context

This transformation is taking place within the context of many independent states, each of which claims sovereignty, including control over and responsiveness to its citizens. In pre-modern civilizations there were, of course, many regimes that can, in retrospect, be thought of as states, but they lacked the exclusiveness and sense of political responsiveness claimed by modern states.

Without taking up the complex issue of what we mean by STATE, and how the state system of post-Westphalian Europe came into existence, we need to keep its distinctive features in mind as a foundational context for this analysis. However, I should say that I use this word in a rather simple way to refer to the government of an independent country. I do not have in mind more complex constructions that reify some kind of idealized notion which combines government and people in a comprehensive gestalt, or attributes to states a capacity for action that rises above that of its government.

The reification of states is supported by attributing sovereignty to them, and we often link the two ideas in the phrase, sovereign state. However, I think we should dissociate the notion of sovereignty from the idea of a state. When one speaks of a sovereign state, one may actually be thinking of its independence, a property of states that is constructed in inter-state systems on the basis of treaties or agreements that protect states from intervention by other states. We sometimes also use sovereignty to refer to a claim that states have an inherent right to make decisions affecting people, especially their own citizens. However, this reflects an anachronism. Historically, monarchs, claiming sovereignty based on supernatural sources, claimed to be sovereigns entitled to impose claims on their subjects. The shift from royal to popular sovereignty that accompanied democratization reversed this paradigm: it is no longer the right of sovereign states to impose obligations on their subjects: instead it has become the duty of states to respect the rights and needs of the sovereign people from whom they derive the right to rule. The basic meaning of SOVEREIGNTY involves the source of a state's legitimacy: either sovereigns rule by virtue of a supernatural mandate or people have sovereignty and can delegate the power to rule to their representatives. The basic political struggle of modernity has involved the replacement of the former belief by the latter. It's not an easy transformation to accomplish, and in the process many illegitimate states rooted in terror and the use of violence have come into existence.

In short, the sovereign rights of states are not inherent in their existence. Ideal republics have no more inherent rights of sovereignty than brutal tyrannies. States acquire their powers from some source of sovereignty: traditionally, sovereigns were rulers invested with supernatural powers but modern states govern legitimately when their powers are derived from people who can exercise their sovereign rights. States exercise sovereignty only on the basis of having received it from some non-state source: they cannot give themselves sovereignty -- it must receive their powers from some source outside themselves . A state is not sovereign because it is a state -- rather states enjoy legitimate authority when someone invests them with sovereignty, and some states govern without legitimacy, as do robber bands and gangsters.

On problem with popular sovereignty involves questions about who has the status of a people. The answer is often that only communities sharing common traditions, culture, or ancestry can claim sovereignty. This idea leads to the notion of a nation. However, it is as difficult to decide who constitutes a nation as to set parameters for the concept of a people. However, it seems plausible to argue that sovereignty cannot be exercised by any random collection of humans -- they become capable of exercising sovereignty only when they enjoy some sense of solidarity. This solidarity can take the form of a nation and also, therefore, of a state. In contemporary usage, the two words are confusingly linked, as in the phrase, nation state. In the name, United Nations, we see a prevalent usage in which nation has even become a synonym for state.

More realistically, we need to distinguish between states that claim the right to rule on behalf of a nation, and communities that claim the right to govern themselves even though they do not have a state of their own. This means that sovereign nation can sometimes refer to states that claim sovereignty, and sometimes to stateless communities that want to become states. Sovereignty is no more an attribute of nations than of states, but in both cases aspiring nations as well as states claim sovereignty so as to legitimize their claimed right to exercise power. States use this claim in their efforts to create nations, and nations use the claim of sovereignty in their efforts to become states. I refer to the former as state nations, and the latter as ethnic nations: they represent different and competing projects.

Forms of Nationalism

State nations promote STATE NATIONALISM and ethnic nations encourage ETHNIC NATIONALISM. State nationalism is older and well established in many states where ruling elites have attempted to assimilate minorities -- or eliminate them. These are not spontaneous or universal processes, however. They result, I believe, from forces generated by industrialization and democratization, the twin pillars of modernity. In order for industrialization to succeed, the corporations formed to organize mass production and marketing needed capital, workers, and markets. These processes could only succeed, ultimately, if the grip of monarchic power was broken and replaced by political institutions responsive to the needs of capital and the increasingly powerful entrepreneurs who spearheaded these changes.

The switch from monarchic to popular sovereignty provided a cover for the underlying economic forces involved in industrialization. To manage these forces, the newly empowered bourgeoisie found it necessary to draw lines between the "people" who could be trusted to exercise sovereignty in support of property and, essentially, the "non-people" who would be excluded because the newly empowered property holders did not trust them. The ancient principles of family, clan, or ancestry which supported caste-like social system in which the possession of land was crucially important were replaced by more broadly applicable barriers of religion, language and race which enabled entrepreneurial ruling communities to privilege their members and marginalize non-members. The beneficiaries of this change saw themselves as a nation, and excluded outsiders from membership. Eventually, the such ruling nations were equated states. Democracy was seen as a right that nations could exercise on behalf of their members -- this right included control over a state, and the duty of states to protect the interests of their nations. In short, every nation had the right to a state, and every state should both represent and take care of its own nation. Our tendency to equate the meaning of state and nation, as noted above, can be seen in our acceptance of the term, United Nations, for a union of states.

As a reaction against the equation of nations and states, members of excluded communities began to band together and claim the rights of nationhood for themselves. From this has evolved the notion of an ETHNIC NATION , i.e., a community that lacks a state but would like to have one. The members of such communities normally have some kind of ancestral myth and shared language or religion that unites them and provides a basis for political mobilization, an emerging a sense of solidarity and shared grievances against the state (or states) in which they are living. I believe the sense of national unity cultivated in ethnic nations is probably more strongly motivated by these grievances than by historical memories and communal solidarity. In fact, the effort of states to create a sense of national identity among their citizens is directly responsible for provoking a negative reaction among those who feel excluded by the process of state- building. To the degree that any members of a state are marginalized by state nation projects, they will respond with outrage. Some, as noted above, claim membership in the state, demanding citizenship and all its rights. By contrast, those who are sufficiently antagonized and can use historical grievances to gain support for their cause may prefer to take an alternate path -- they organize to demand autonomy or independence for themselves.

A growing number of communities have embraced the banner of ethnic nationalism and their movements predictably provoke defensive reactions in their HOST STATES, a term we may use for all states whose membership includes ethnic nations. The resulting conflicts have become a terribly disruptive force in today's world. Rather unthinkingly, we use the phrase, nation state to refer to any independent state on the premise that its members constitute a nation. If we use UNPO . Reports by scholarly outsiders about these nations can be found in "Minorities at Risk" project at the University of Maryland, under the direction of Ted Gurr. See: MAR

Ethnic conflict can be understood as having two main forms which can be distinguished from each other by using the terms, diversity and cleavage. Problems associated with ETHNIC CLEAVAGES involve nationalists who reject their status as citizens and demand, instead, that they should have their own state. The distinction is important because different state responses are needed. Policies that can resolve the problems of ethnic diversity will not work for problems of ethnic cleavage. In order to talk about both of them simultaneously, I use the more general term, ethnic conflict.

Traditionally, many communities were, indeed, abused by dominant elites but they tended to accept their misfortunes as unavoidable, as the result of forces beyond their control. As subjects, they could not realistically expect that protest would improve their lot -- instead, they saw that obedience and respect for superiors would help them more. By contrast, as a result of the spread of modern class-oriented ideas of equal opportunity and social mobility, cultural minorities who feel that have been discriminated against, tend to mobilize to resist. They feel that they are victims of injustice and that corrective action is both desirable and possible. This leads to ethnic conflict in both forms: diversity and cleavage.

State Membership: as Citizens or Subjects

In modern times, subjects want to become citizens, persons deserving of respect and sovereignty. Strangely, we lack a convenient term for those who live more or less permanently in a state, whether as fully accepted citizens or as marginalized subjects. I shall refer to them as MEMBERS * The whole population of a state constitutes its membership. The problem facing many members of contemporary states is how to terminate their status as subjects in order to become citizens -- either in the state where they live, or in a new state they might create. As the norms and hopes of democracy spread, an increasing number of members in all states, regardless of their location, are affected by this problem. Even in the most developed democracies, there are some members who feel marginalized, and in the least developed societies, a growing number of members want to gain the advantages of citizenship. Membership of a state as mere subjects is no longer acceptable -- everyone wants to be a citizen and replace injustice with justice.

Justice does not mean equality in all respects -- indeed, economic and social inequalities resulting from work that reflects success or failure in human enterprise is widely accepted as inevitable and even desirable in any class-oriented society. However, when inequalities are attributed to ascriptive factors such as one's religion, language, or race, then they are perceived as unfair or unjust. Moreover, corrective action is expected in the context of a state. Above all, citizenship means equality of opportunity in the state as symbolized by the right to vote, and the right to equal protection by the law.

The mobilization of ethnic minorities to protest and demand justice is, therefore, not a traditional phenomenon but results directly from the extension of unfulfilled promises, especially those made possible by the spread of democratic ideals and industrialization. However, there are two sides of this process. While members seeking equality and justice demand changes that will improve their situation in the state, members of more privileged communities may feel threatened, fearing that their privileges will be sacrificed if the demands made by mobilizing minorities are satisfied. Such clashes are often attributed to ETHNIC DIVERSITY. However, as explained above, ETHNIC COMPLEXITY has been ubiquitous in all civilizations and, by itself, does not explain conflict. Rather, conflict arises when diversity is associated with incompatible demands and expectations. These demands are a product of the new norms of equality and justice promoted by modernity. Because of globalization, these norms are spreading more rapidly around the world where minorities in many countries are mobilizing to demand justice and respect, and established communities often resist these demands, sometimes without violence, but often violently also.

Political strategies that seek to empower minority citizens and give them an acceptable role in a state can scarcely help those who feel they do not want to be members. Although many individuals are ambivalent and not sure in their own minds whether or not they want to be citizens of a given state, we need to think about the modal cases and consider what constitutional structures would be most appropriate for a democracy wishing to deal equitably and non-violently with both kinds of ethnic community: its minority citizens and its ethnonational rebels. The constitutional practices appropriate for handling ethnic diversity are different from those required by ethnic cleavages, as I shall now explain.

Management of Ethnic Conflict: Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism

Non-democratic states are unable, I believe, to solve these problems -- indeed, they are bond to become more acute in them although, admittedly, a ruthless dictatorship, especially in a one-party system, may be able, temporarily, to suppress ethnic discontent and delay the ultimate day of reckoning. Eventually, however, the forces of globalization will catch up with them and result in even more violent explosions.

By contrast, although democracies will surely experience many difficulties when trying to handle problems caused by ethnic grievances, they have a much better chance of finding nonviolent solutions to these problems than do non-democratic regimes. However, among democracies, I believe parliamentary regimes will be able to find solutions more quickly and efficiently than presidentialist regimes.

Since it is important here to distinguish between states and nations, it seems necessary to restrict the adjective, national, to members or properties of a nation. I will, therefore, avoid using national to refer to any property of a state. We can also distinguish between members of a state nation and an ethnic nation by using the capitalized word, National for the former, and ethnonational for the latter. Thus Nationals in America consider themselves to be Americans, but ethnonationals in the U.S. are people in America but do not identify themselves as Americans -- instead, they identify with some other national community. Thus a Cherokee, Mohawk, Puerto Rican or Hawaiian who rejects the status of being an American is an ethnonational but not a National. (Admittedly, the word national also has legal meanings, such as membership of a dependent territory but not a citizen -- that meaning will never be intended here.)

State Levels: Central/Local Distinctions and International Status

Another distinction that needs to be made here contrasts the central authorities of a state with local groups and entities. In American usage, state is often used to refer to one of the 50 states in the federal system. To avoid ambiguity, I shall use state only for the federal regime, while using sub-state to refer to any member of the federation. Sometimes sovereign state is used to distinguish between a federation and its federal sub-states. However, for reasons given above, any such use of sovereign is also confusing -- especially since all 50 sub-states in the American federation claim to be "sovereign." It is easy enough to refer to an independent state as one whose status is recognized in the world's system of international law. In this paper I use state only to mean an independent state.

Unfortunately, we also use national to refer to the central authorities of a regime by contrast with local bodies -- consider national parks by contrast with city parks, or national income used to refer to the aggregate income of all citizens. It is difficult to avoid using the word in this sense but, to overcome confusion, I shall substitute central or federal whenever these words make sense. However, both of these words are contextual: thus central in central park is not necessarily national, and in non-federal states, it is illogical to speak of federal authorities -- this word, therefore, can only be used to mean central in federated countries, like the U.S.

To be completely clear, a neologism might be necessary -- here's a suggestion. We could use PATRIAL * to characterize any property of a country's governmental authority -- the root, patria-, referring in Latin to one's native (father) land, is used in patriotic to refer to love of country. Interestingly, we use expatriate to speak of those who leave their own country, and repatriate for those who return home. Why not enrich our vocabulary by using this stem to create terms for the properties of a state? At least here, I shall refer to any attribute of a state's central government as patrial. Actually, we could even use "national (patrial)" to show that one is using "national" to refer to a state rather than an ethnonation . Of course, "central" or "federal" could also be used when appropriate, and linked with patrial whenever ambiguity seemed possible. Finally, note that when using patrial in this sense, the first syllable should rhyme with pay, not Pat.

Ethnic Diversity and Minority Representation

Thinking first about diversity, I think that regimes based on the constitutional separation-of-powers will experience more serious difficulties in their efforts to cope with ethnic conflict than parliamentary regimes. Under parliamentary rules, it is possible for proportional representation to be achieved by having multi-member districts so that at least the more important ethnic minorities can be represented in Parliament and participate in multi-party coalition governments. This is a broad claim and it needs to be qualified by reference to different kinds of electoral systems and, of course, to the way ethnic minorities are distributed in a population, their size, level of mobilization, economic status, etc. By contrast, proportional representation tends to be dysfunctional in presidentialist regimes. The most obvious problem arises from the fact that with an elected Congress as head of government, power is concentrated in one person and even though a cabinet may be constituted with minority members, it is not a ruling body and its members are primarily accountable to one person, the President, not to representatives of their own communities. Empirically, I think it can be shown that in presidentialist regimes where PR has been used, the results have been more disruptive than constructive -- at least, so far as I know, all of them have experienced catastrophic break-downs.

Of course, parliamentary systems do not necessarily have multi-member districts nor use PR -- the English Westminster model is a conspicuous and important example. I suspect that there are reasons in English history which have made the system viable at home despite its retention of the single-member district principle. However, overseas in states influenced by the Westminster model, more serious problems have erupted leading to decisions to revise or modify this model in favor of some system that would help minorities more. However, such remedies can actually be counter-productive. A good example is what happened in India under British rule when a decision was made in London to ear-mark some seats in Parliament for minority members, notably Muslims. The result was the emergence of the Muslim League: its campaigns for these seats led to the extreme polarization which brought the dismemberment of India and the creation of Pakistan, accompanied by massive violence and the slaughter of millions. Some further reflections on the relation of parliamentarism to the solution of problems of ethnic diversity can be found in my paper, Ethnic Diversity, Nationalism and Constitutional Democracy: ED

Ethnic Cleavages and Surrendering Authority

When dealing with ethnic cleavages, the problem is not how to empower minorities wishing to participate in the established decision-making processes of a state. Rather, it involves the surrender of authority over an ethnonational community and empowering it to become self-governing. Not surprisingly, that is a very difficult process. However, in response to demands made by ethnic minorities to achieve independence or autonomy, it seems to be true that parliamentary regimes can usually respond more effectively than presidentialist regimes. Actually, it is a step that has occurred many times during the last half century in the process of de-colonization. However, in most of those situations the nation demanding independence was an exclave, which is to say its geographic boundaries were outside those of the imperial state. By contrast, most of the ethnic nations demanding independence or autonomy today are enclaves -- their lands exist within the boundaries of their HOST STATES * . This hampers their prospects of success because regimes are much more likely to resist the surrender of power to an enclave than they are to an exclave, for a variety of reasons that need not be explained here.

This is not just a matter of making a law that applies to everyone within a country's jurisdiction, but it involves exempting those living within an enclave from these laws, and authorizing them to create their own laws. In a presidentialist regime, this involves gaining support for such an exception not only from the President, but also from the Congress and the Supreme Court -- and perhaps also from the population at large by means of a referendum. These are high hurdles -- the establishment of autonomies (reservations) for indigenous communities in the U.S. was possible, I believe, only because such decisions could by-pass normal political procedures due to the special constitutional status accorded to treaties made by the U.S. with existing states, including "tribal" regimes.

In parliamentary regimes, by contrast, Parliaments have the ultimate authority to make decisions, including fundamental laws that have constitutional significance. Procedurally, therefore, it is simpler in parliamentary than in presidentialist system to make the decisions that involve surrendering authority over a minority community. That fact does not necessarily make it possible for a government to surrender power. However, when we take into account the dynamics of decision-making in a Congress as compared with a Parliament, we can see how it may well be more difficult for the latter to make such decisions.

In presidentialist regimes, the separation of powers in fact requires the Congress to micro-manage public policy making. By contrast, under parliamentary rule, the fusion of powers results in the exercise of these powers by the Cabinet, subject to parliamentary approval. Thus the central ("patrial") interest may override the particularistic interests of locally-elected legislators. Cabinet government means that it is possible to process a large number of decisions in a coordinated way, linking powerful senior career officials with politically responsible Cabinet members. I believe they likely to believe that it is advantageous for a state to allow non-nationals to govern themselves. In exchange for the surrender of direct authority over an enclave, the regime avoids the political costs of perpetual conflict with its people and reduces the administrative expenses involved in efforts to enforce unacceptable laws on a rebellious minority. Moreover, the surrender of direct rule does not necessarily mean the loss of influence. The people living in any enclave will surely want to engage in external relations involving trade, travel, and communication and they will need help in many ways from their host country. Because of increased mobility, citizens of any autonomy must live and work in growing numbers outside their boundaries, under the control of their host states. In exchange for whatever external support or assistance a host state can provide, it may legitimately make reciprocal demands that promote harmony between the two jurisdictions.

By contrast, under presidentialist rules, members of Congress from districts or provinces are likely to believe they will be adversely affected by grants of autonomy to enclaves within their constituencies. Although transferring authority from the central government to an autonomy may not seem like a great sacrifice to a country's leaders at the center, it may strike those at the district or provincial level as a much greater loss. A conspicuous example could be seen in Quebec where resistance to the loss of control over indigenous lands seems to be much greater than it would be in Ottawa. On the assumption that Congressional committees responsible for making any decision on the surrender of authority to an autonomy -- such as an "Indian Reservation" in the U.S. -- would include representatives from the affected states but not from the minority seeking autonomy -- we might imagine that they would be able to block action. By contrast, no such veto groups could block action in a Parliament where decisions about such matters would be made in Cabinet, with the advice of senior bureaucrats, all of whom -- as noted above -- are likely to be more interested in the welfare of the state as a whole than in the interests of adjacent communities who might be especially worried by grants of autonomy enclaves in their territory. Admittedly this is a somewhat speculative proposition, but I think it is worth investigating -- my point is that parliamentary regimes can probably recognize and establish autonomies more easily than presidentialist regimes.

A superficial look at existing cases seems t o confirm this impression. We can think of many parliamentary systems in which autonomies have been established: from the Aaland Islands in Finland and Greenland in Denmark to Catalonia and Basque autonomies in Spain; Tyrol in Italy; Quebec and Nunavut in Canada; Scotland and Wales in the UK -- the problems in Northern Ireland are internal to the region and London is quite willing to devolve authority for self-government.

By contrast, in presidentialist countries there are few such autonomies and struggles to establish them are often violent: consider the Chechnya case in Russia and Kosovo in Serbia. The ability of the U.S. to recognize autonomy in Puerto Rico, the Northern Marianas, and many American Indian Reservations is exceptional and reflects some special circumstances in the U.S. situation.

Personal or Corporate Autonomy

Unfortunately, all members of ethnic nations do not live compactly within bounded areas, especially in enclaves surrounded by land belonging to the host country. In fact, many if not most of them have members who live in diaspora, i.e., dispersed from their original home lands. A perplexing problem for every ethnic nation, therefore, is how to accommodate the demands and hopes of members not living within their enclave. In fact, in some cases there is no such enclave and all members of a nation live scattered among other peoples. The most familiar case was that of the Jews in dispersion before the establishment of Israel.

One proposed solution that could recognize and support a solution to their dreams of national identity and autonomy involves something that has been called personal or corporate autonomy. Using the analogy of a corporation, one may think of members as shareholders, and the corporate body as an ethnonational corporation. No matter where they live, they can be members of the corporation, elect its board of directors, and share in the benefits it provides, including the use of whatever lands it may own, however scattered they may be. Such an ethnic corporation would differ from ordinary business organizations because of the ethnic markers required for membership. They could manage schools and churches for their members, publish newspapers and manage radio and televison stations, sponsor home pages and listservs on the INTERNET. In fact, there already exist a great many ethnic associations that promote the interests of members of their own ethnic community. They often see themselves as in diaspora, with or without dependence on a homeland state. An interesting list of Web Sites for Asians in diaspora, in many countries, can be found at: Diaspora

No doubt, ordinary associations in the private sector of any democracy can already do many of these things. What would distinguish an ETHNO-CORP * if I may use this shortened term for it, would be state recognition, including autonomy. Such recognition would give members of an ethno-corp immunity from rules that apply to all citizens on the premise that it would create and enforce its own rules. No doubt, such an arrangement could create many controversies between members and non-members. Procedures would be needed to adjudicate conflicts between different systems co-existing in the same place.

One example of such a set-up may be found in Alaska where indigenous peoples already have the right to belong to such (ethno)corporations. The idea was proposed during the Austro-Hungarian Empire by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner and, apparently, was implemented in Estonia during the inter-war years. I cannot discuss it further here, but this is a subject that deserves independent and extended treatment (Nimni 1999).

Multiculturalism is usually understood in terms of ethnic diversity. The idea of individual or corporate autonomy (ethno-corporativism) could be a bridge between diversity and ethnic cleavage. For any ethno-corp to succeed, it would surely have to be recognized by a host state and the special rights and duties of its members would need to be carefully spelled out in "treaties" or "conventions" subject to monitoring and adjudication procedures to handle disputes that could easily arise and to find orderly non-violent means to solve them.

When autonomies are established within a state, their success also hinges on variables related to the parliamentary/presidential distinction. We need to think not only about the willingness of regimes to establish autonomies, but also their capacity to live harmoniously with them after they have been created, in the form of autonomies and also, I assume, of corporate autonomy.

Relating to Autonomies

Relations between a state and its autonomies need to be monitored or administered by officials of the host state. At the minimum level, these can take a quasi-diplomatic form -- resident agents of the state dealing equitably with the leaders of autonomies and having no authority in their domestic affairs. However, state officials may try to exercise peremptory authority within an autonomy, and even abuse their powers. This means that we need to look at the role of state (patrial) agents assigned to manage relations with an autonomy.

The nature of these relationships is affected, I believe, by the design of the constitutional system. In general, presidentialist regimes, because of the separation-of-powers, are less able to monitor appointed officials and hold them accountable than are parliamentary regimes in which the fusion of powers prevails. In most presidentialist regimes, bureaucrats are political appointees who hold their positions indefinitely -- they may be called RETAINERS * . Precisely because they are appointed by patronage, they are likely to have local connections in the area surrounding any enclave where they might be posted. By contrast, most parliamentary regimes appoint long-term career officers (mandarins) on the basis of a merit system

What are the implications of this difference for the management of relations between a state and autonomous enclaves within it's territory? Consider, first, the bureaucratic situation under presidentialist regimes. On the premise that patronage prevails in the appointment of public officials, we may assume that civil servants, like the elected politicians, will be particularly sensitive to the interests of the citizens who brought them to office. Since, by definition, non-nationals in autonomous enclaves will not be able to share in the electoral process, their interests may well be ignored with impunity by officials assigned to work with them. The presidentialist formula for public administration, therefore, is structurally disposed to heighten tensions between public officials and the members of autonomous enclaves.

In these regimes, the selection of officers assigned to administer or work inside each enclave offers opportunities for patronage that can scarcely be resisted: members of Congress are tempted to use their authority to reward supporters with appointments and they are not much concerned about the needs of those who had nothing to do with their election. Even when countervailing pressures and historical events compel a regime to grant some degree of local autonomy to "native" communities, a legislature in which they have no voice will, predictably, favor the interests of their outsider constituents who may wish to encroach on reserved lands in order to promote their own mining, grazing, lumbering or other special interests. To the degree that they can influence appointments through the patronage system, they will tend to favor candidates willing and able to favor local constituents at the expense of the non-citizens living in autonomies.

The American system is exceptional because, for historical reasons, it was able to establish a career system for specialists in combination with a spoils system for "in-and-out" appointees in policy making posts ([Heclo, 1977]) . I have discussed the reasons for this difference and its consequences at some length elsewhere. [(Riggs, 1997b]) .The situation in the U S. is, therefore, somewhat anomalous for presidentialist regimes because of the historical events that led to the establishment of specialized career services: the American Indian Bureau has been able to recruit a quite few members from ethno-national communities on the assumption that they have specialized knowledge, including language skills and cultural knowledge, that will strengthen the administration of national policies involving these autonomies. Nevertheless,, there is some disagreement about their ability to empathize with the tribal peoples as against their tendency, under central (patrial) control, to prioritize government policies and to be seen as traitors by minority peoples. Moreover, there are at least half a dozen other government agencies with special responsibility for Indian programs, but I am unable to comment on how they are managed and coordinated at the autonomy level.

Under parliamentary rule, however, it is feasible to maintain career generalists as bureaucrats who can be given responsibility for managing ethnic enclaves. Normally such officials are not subject to much political interference from Parliament and the liberal education they typically have may incline them to be sympathetic to local cultures and the interests of those under their authority. Politically, they are likely to have a relatively free hand to conduct local administration in their assigned domains and to make the compromises that will minimize controversy.

This general posture enhances opportunities to adapt the administration of ethnic enclaves to local conditions, to rely heavily on advisory groups composed of local notables, and to respect the decisions made by "tribal" authorities. In fact, it is probably in the interest of career officers responsible for administering projects in ethnic enclave to minimize their own work-load by devolving responsibility to local leaders and administrators as much as possible. Indeed, if they find that the costs of intervention exceed the benefits, they may be glad to devolve most of their responsibilities to locally elected politicians or even traditional chiefs.

To recapitulate: consideration of the constitutional consent formula, the locus of decision-making and bureaucratic differences lead me to think that a parliamentary regime is more likely to be able to surrender authority to ethno-national enclaves and maintain good relations with them than a democracy grounded in the separation-of-powers.

Apart from the parliamentary/presidentialist distinction, a related question to consider is the geographical distribution of power in a democratic polity. Classically, three possibilities are mentioned: confederation, federation, and unitary states. All are treated as states in the international system but, internally, they range from a centrally controlled polity to a loosely structured set of autonomous sub-states.

After the U.S. gained its independence, a confederal government was created based on the equal representation of each former colony in a single assembly. Inter-state conflicts, however, soon made it clear that this system would not survive. The Philadelphia Convention intervened and created the Constitution 1789 which was crafted as a federal system. In this compromise or intermediate pattern, the sub-states are viewed as "sovereign" entities, but substantial powers were assigned to the "federal" (patrial) government. In the original constitutional design, members of the lower House of Representatives were elected on a one-person one vote basis, as in unitary regimes, but the upper house, the Senate, represented the constituent states, each of which was assigned two seats regardless of population size -- a confederal concept.

The expectation was that in this amalgam, the House would be able to adopt laws in response to general public opinion, but the interests of each sub-state would be protected by the Senate. Subsequently, however, the electoral rules were changed so that Senators are now chosen by popular votes, but their number retains the original design, giving each state an equal voice. In practice, both houses tend to act on behalf of the whole country. Although individual members give high priority of the interests of their constituents, whether they be districts or states, their rhetoric suggests that decisions in both chambers are oriented to the concerns of the country as a whole. However, in recent years, since the Ronald Reagan presidency, a conservative judiciary has increasingly emphasized state's rights -- for details see Stephen Pomper (Washington Monthly) -- available at: WM

Switzerland as a Model

A design that would protect the sovereign rights of autonomies while promoting harmony between them and also serve the general interests of all citizens is needed in order to achieve a more balanced structure -- something that can combine the confederal and unitary principles of organization. The best example in an existing state can be found, I think, in the government of Switzerland. Although it is, officially, a confederation, the term federal is often used when referring to the central government. In fact, the Swiss regime links confederal and unitary components in an interesting way. Each canton has a high degree of self-administration -- it is really an autonomy. The Federal Assembly is a bi-cameral legislature in which the Council of States represents the cantons whereas the National Council is directly elected by universal adult suffrage -- note that the word "federal" appears in the name of the highest organ of this confederation!

The linguistic differences between the cantons create ethnonational analogies with other states in which different ethnonational communities co-exist. What appears to make the Swiss system viable is the distinction between the powers of the Council of States which, essentially, deals with matters involving relations between the cantons and the National Council which legislates on matters where all citizens have a shared interest. When questions would have very different answers in the cantons, the Federal regime avoids involvement and the cantons are truly self-governing autonomies.

The European Union as a Model

A more appropriate model for the kind of constitutional system I am thinking about can be found in the European Union. As explained on its Web Site, "During its first 20 years, the European Commission would propose, the Parliament would advise, the Council of Ministers would decide, and the Court of Justice would interpret. During the last 20 years, however, the Parliament has become directly-elected and acquired new powers, becoming the largest multinational Parliament in the world -- it has become a genuine parliament, representing individuals, not states." See: EU .

Today, the Council of the European Union, which represents its State Members, legislates for the Union, sets its political objectives, and coordinates national policies. Its decisions are made by a qualified majority vote with Member States carrying the following weightings: 10 votes each for Germany, France, Italy and the UK, 8 for Spain, 5 each for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, 4 for Austria and Sweden, 3 for Ireland, Denmark and Finland, and 2 for Luxembourg -- a total of 87 votes. At least 62 votes are required, including support from at least 10 member states, for decisions to be made in most cases, but for some purposes, unanimity is required. The Council is composed of one representative at ministerial level for each Member State with the authority to commit his/her Government. Council members are politically accountable to their national parliaments, something which is possible because all of them have parliamentary regimes. Which Ministers attend a Council meeting varies according to the subject discussed, although its institutional unity remains intact. In addition, there is is a kind of summit entity, the European Council, in which the heads of government make top level policy decisions.

As for the European Parliament, "It represents the 370 million citizens of the Union. Its primary objectives are like those of any Parliament -- to pass good laws and to scrutinise and control the use of executive power. Now more than ever before, it is in a much better position to do both because its responsibilities have been gradually widened and its powers strengthened, first by the Single Act of 1987 and then by the Treaty of European Union of 1993. "

The executive arm of the Union is the European Commission which acts as the heart of Europe. It has 20 Commissioners drawn by a quota system from the Member States, and is supported by a staff of some 15,000 persons. Proposals from the Commission are required before the Council or the Parliament can pass legislation. EU laws are mainly upheld by Commission action -- it preserves the integrity of the single market, promotes European agricultural and regional development policies, and performs many other executive functions.

Interestingly, the design of the EU has some parallels with that of the United Nations, where all member states are equally represented in the General Assembly, but it lacks the authority for enforcing security that is reserved to the Security Council, in which only selected members are seated, and some have a veto power. The EU Commission may be compared, in some respects to the UN Secretariat. Of course, the differences are also significant.

A Possible Uni-Con?

In short, the structure of the European Union is confederal in its respect for the independence of all state members, yet it has the capacity to act on behalf of all Europeans as a collectivity, and it has a reasonably powerful executive arm, making it more than a mere alliance of states. Such a structure, with appropriate modifications, might well be used in any state seeking to accommodate ethnic nations as minorities, and also to take joint action on matters that affect everyone in the state. It would be misleading, I think, to call it either a confederation or a federation. We need a term that suggests the kind of balance between unitary and confederal principles manifest in the European Union -- and, perhaps, Switzerland. I have suggested elsewhere such terms as addominium, federacy, and poly-fed, but I'm not happy with any of them. Another possibility might be uni-con as a short form to represent a unitary/confederal system. Pending a better suggestion, I shall use uni-con here.

To succeed, a uni-con needs to have a name that is acceptable to all of its autonomies as well as the mainstream of its citizens. This creates an interesting other problem of naming. But first, we need to be able to distinguish a state's mainstream entity from its autonomies. Perhaps head could be used. Consider that headland refers to a promontory overlooking the sea, and headwaters to the sources of a river. Could we not say head-state to refer to that state in a uni-con that is the largest or most salient of its member states. Using this terminology, we could refer to all autonomies in a uni-con as member states, including its head-state as well as its autonomies.

This terminology enables us to consider names that would be appropriate for a uni-con. In some cases, like Switzerland and the European Union, the established names are appropriate. However, in the American case we have an unacceptable situation. The United States points only to the sub-states nested in the American head-state. To gain acceptance among indigenous peoples, I believe we should adopt a different name for a uni-con that could include both the American head-state and the indigenous autonomies? I have no good suggestion, but at least one might start hunting for a name. It should be something that does not reflect the ethnocentrism of European conquest as "America" and "Columbia" do. Nor is there any indigenous word that could be appropriated for this purpose. One possibility might be to use a descriptive phrase starting with Atlantic/Pacific as the oceans that define North America. To distinguish the U.S. from Canada and Mexico, one might add a modifier, "Middle" giving us the "Middle/Atlantic/Pacific" country, or "MidAtPac" abbreviated as "M.A.P." -- perhaps easily pronounced as "MAP". I am not proposing the adoption of this name, but merely suggesting that to enable members of autonomies within a uni-con to feel comfortable about their status, countries need names that include the autonomies. Both the "U.S." and "America" clearly exclude them.

An evolving uni-con that might also be discussed in this context is that of the U.K. These letters stand for United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This name omits reference to the insular autonomies, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, which are linked under the British Crown though not represented in Parliament. A new name like Britland could be introduced to provide a unifying label for all the autonomies as well as the English head-state. This name would support Britlander, as distinct from Brit, a short form that excludes the autonomies and Northern Ireland.

In some countries, existing names do distinguish citizens of a state from members of its head state. Consider, for example, Burmans by comparison with Burmese -- the former identifies all citizens of Burma and the latter, more restrictively, names only those belonging to the head-state (or dominant nation). The name, Thailand, excludes non-Thai minorities -- it replaced Siam in response to nationalist sentiments. Malays and Malaysian makes a similar distinction between the dominant Malay (Muslim) community, and citizens of the state, many of whom are not Muslims. Although Canadienne clearly identifies French-speaking citizens of Canada, the term Canadian can be used ambiguously to include everyone living in Canada, or only the Anglophones -- in ordinary usage it may also distinguish between the "other nations" of Canada and members of the "first nations."

No doubt the naming of a uni-con is only marginally important as compared with the design of its basic structure and institutions, but it does have a symbolic value that is important in helping members of autonomies (such as indigenous peoples) to feel that they belong to the larger system. Moreover, it can help us discuss the design of a uni-con by giving us names for suggested new state formations. More importantly, the structure of a uni-con needs to have a component that represents and supports the autonomy of each member state while promoting agreements on problems of joint interest to everyone living in the uni-con. In such a context, I also believe parliamentary regimes will find it easier to establish and maintain a uni-con than presidentialist regimes.

Returning to the context of globalization, it is important, I think, to recognize that the rapid escalation of all the different processes that are so rapidly linking everyone living on our planet today, is a result of modernizing forces rooted in the industrial revolution, democratization, and the rise of ethnic nationalism. To deal with these forces, to fend off their dangers and to take advantage of the opportunities they offer, countries need to have democratic rather than authoritarian regimes, and they will, I believe, be more successful if these regimes follow parliamentary rather than presidentialist constitutional principles. However, they also need to consider the possibility of making some fundamental constitutional innovations that move in the direction of creating uni-coms. Only by linking the advantages of confederalism with the benefits of unitary rule can states accommodate the aspirations and needs of ethnic nations living within their territories.

* This glossary is limited to new concepts and terms introduced in this paper -- plus entries for equivocal terms, i.e., words that have more than one meaning in this context. Terms found in a definition that are defined in another entry are underlined. For information about the methodology and logic of this approach see: COCTA Memo

AUTONOMY: an autonomous ethnic nation enclosed within the boundaries of a host state.

CABINET: a "Cabinet" [capitalized] is a ruling group in parliamentary regimes, exercising executive power subject to discharge by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence. (This is a special type of "cabinet," using the word more broadly to cover any grou